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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the thorniest issue in more than four decades of
international tax planning for transactions among related taxpayers
is that of transfer pricing. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)
provided the statutory basis for addressing issues of allocation of
income and deductions, requiring that allocations of income and
deductions be based upon an "arm's length standard."' I.R.C. §
1. I.R.C. § 482 (1986); 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988). In pertinent part, § 482 states "in any case
of two or more organizations ... or businesses... owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations... or businesses if he determines that such.
. is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such
organizations ... or businesses." I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
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482 provides omnibus authority for the Commissioner to reallocate
income, deductions, credits or allowances as though the transaction
had been entered into between parties operating at arm's length.
The arm's length standard has been clarified over the years,
particularly in 1969, at which time § 482 regulations were first
promulgated.2
Two of the more difficult questions to arise under § 482 are:
(1) Is there ever a completely "closed" transaction
among taxpayers controlled by the same interest so
that the Commissioner is denied a "bite at the
apple" under § 482? (otherwise stated, Can there
be an economic reality among related taxpayers
such that the tax consequences of the transaction
may be fully contemplated at the time the contract
is signed?), and
(2) Can an economic procedure be created which
enables related parties to enter into transfer priced
contracts on a basis which will withstand § 482
scrutiny by the Commissioner?
Issues arising under § 482 are not limited to "outbound"
transactions. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has shown
considerable concern over foreign investment in the United States,
suggesting that substantial amounts are underpaid by foreign firms
through the device of "transfer pricing." Japanese firms are
increasingly being closely scrutinized since the net trade surplus of
Japan with the United States has provided substantial amounts of
dollars to be reinvested in the United States economy.3 Some have
criticized the Internal Reveriue Service for failing to provide
proposed regulations concerning the "commensurate with income"
standard under the revised § 482 of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
However, the Service has been approaching the task with serious
deliberation, particularly following the U.S. Department of
Treasury's § 482 "White Paper" released in the fall of 1988. The
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1990).
3. Stout, IRS Seeks to Determine if Foreign Firms Owe Billions of Dollars in U.S. Taxes,
Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1990, at A6.
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White Paper proposals recommended increased documentation of
transactions involving transfer pricing of intangibles, and required
that all the documentation be provided at the beginning of an
examination of a taxpayer's return.4 The Service appears to have
taken to heart the suggestions of the Treasury § 482 White Paper
and has incorporated them into the draft revenue procedure on
advanced determination rulings.
One of the long standing debates among economists is whether
businesses employ average cost pricing or marginal cost pricing in
conducting their operations. The difference in approaches may well
lead to significant differences in profitability. Economic theory
establishes the theoretical foundations that, in terms of Pareto
optimality in the purely competitive market place, marginal cost
pricing is a necessity.5 However, evidence tends to indicate that
the large majority of businesses use average cost pricing in
conducting operations since both practically and theoretically it is
a simpler approach.6 Indeed, since marginal cost pricing implies
the existence of perfect information, and given the reality that there
exist substantial imperfections in the market place for information,
it would seem that even large corporations with sophisticated staffs
of economists only approach marginal cost pricing asymptotically.
The Internal Revenue Service, in carrying out the policy
mandates of legislation, is charged with not exacting "rough
justice," but with implementing procedures and regulations which
produce tax revenues based on rather precise notions of economic
4. Bonney & Sherwood, White Paper Proposalsfor Intercompany and Intangible Transfers,
15 INT'L TAX J. 91 (1989).
5. See W. BAUMO., ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 512ff (4th ed. 1977).
See also Silk & Moscowitz, Marginal Analysis: The Case of Continental Airlines 203; Kempner,
Costs and Prices in Launderettes 205 in MCCONNELL & CAMPBELL, ECONOMIC ISSUES: READINOS
AND CASES (1969).
6. There are more than five million firms in the United States, many small, family owned
and operated, without the expertise or wherewithal to procure the expertise necessary to engage in
marginal cost pricing. However, some economists argue that competitive forces necessitate an
asymptotic approach to marginal cost pricing, with the firms unable to meet the demands of economic
necessity being driven from the -industry.
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reality.7 The Service employs a notion of economic reality which
presumes that "perfect information" exists in the market place and
that firms operate within an "arm's length" of each other. Given
these two conditions, the Service prices transactions to reflect the
Pareto optimality of the purely competitive market place. It is not
difficult to understand the inherent conflict which results when
businesses, required to make pricing decisions in an instant, faced
with imperfect information, base those decisions upon notions of
average cost pricing, and the Service, having years to draft
regulations to implement policy based upon marginal cost pricing,
end up at an impass.
The purpose of this article will be to explore the position of
the Service regarding the assertions that the development of
regulations pursuant to the "commensurate with income" standard
added to § 482 by the 1986 Tax Reform Act on the transfer of
intangibles, supports the proposition that the Service bases its
approach to regulation upon the Pareto optimizing notions of
marginal cost pricing.
An interesting aspect of the taxing powers of the United States
government, is the fact that the IRS Commissioner appears to have
the power to choose the best of both worlds, as the Commissioner's
view of economic reality dictates. Thus, on the one hand, with
respect to a contract between two parties, even though there remain
obligations to be performed, the Service can determine that the
economic reality underlying the transaction is such that the income
is deemed received by a party which the Service wishes to tax.8
While on the other hand, as we shall see in, the context of § 482,
the Commissioner has the authority indefinitely to review the
economic reality underlying a contract to determine if the price,
indeed, reflects the economic reality consistent with the
commensurate with income standard, regardless of the parties'
honest effort to fix contractual obligations at arm's length. The
7. From time to time, IRS Commissioners have suggested that simplification of the tax
structure would necessarily imply implementation of laws which would exact "rough justice," that
is, a statutory approach that would be more in accord with "average" economic notions than
marginal notions.
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 451 (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3(c)(2) (1990).
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Commissioner retains the authority to review all transactions even
though the review may be several or even many years after the
transaction was cast. Given the Commissioner's power to
indefinitely undertake an arm's length standard review of the
contract to determine if the terms and conditions originally agreed
upon are consistent with the income which the transacion generates
over the course of its life, a contract for the transfer of intangibles
between related parties is never fully executory.
Many of the transactions to which this review would apply
involve the types of high risk transactions in which substantial
capital will be required to be invested. In these transactions, there
is a speculative belief that above-market rates of return may be
garnered in the course of the lifecycle of the transaction. In view
of the commensurate with income standard, to the extent that the
returns to the transaction are above those consistent with normal
economic profits, the transaction will be recast as not being based
upon an arm's length standard which is commensurate with
income. However, given the fact that transactions to which the
commensurate with income standard will apply involve parties
which receive tax-favored treatment,9 the tax paying public may
well deem the § 482 powers to be entirely appropriate.
Recently a number of prominent international tax practitioners
considered the draft revenue procedure on advance transfer price
rulings, estimating the cost of compliance with it to be, at an
absolute minimum, $100,000, with a more likely figure to be
between $500,000 and a million dollars."0 Accepting the
proposition that transactions costs allocated to legal fees should be
no more than one-half to one percent of the total value of a
transaction; the procedure would only be of benefit for transactions
in the amount of at least ten million dollars, with a more likely
minimum transaction value being somewhere between fifty and one
hundred million dollars. Needless to say, few transactions involving
9. Under appropriate circumstances, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations may
defer recognition of income in the United States until earnings are repatriated.
10. The practitioners referenced above included the private sector co-chairs for the Internal
Revenue Service's 1990 3rd Annual Institute on International Taxation entitled, "Current Issues in
International Taxation."
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the transfer of assets, either tangible or intangible, will support the
use of the draft revenue procedure on advance transfer price
rulings, without contemplation of opportunity costs engendered as
result of the inevitable delays so commonly a part of complying
with such procedures.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE DRAFr REVENUE PROCEDURE
The organization of the draft Revenue Procedure (Rev. Proc.)
is straightforward and unremarkable. The first section is a statement
of its purpose. The second describes the scope of the draft revenue
procedure. The third section is a brief discussion of the background
which motivates the issuance of the revenue procedure together
with an overview of the role of the taxpayer and the Service in the
ADR procedures. The fourth section is one of the two principal
substantive sections which states the requirements which must be
fulfilled in order to obtain an advance determination ruling. Section
5 details the form and content of request for an advance
determination ruling. Section 6 outlines the procedure the Service
employs to process requests for an advance determination ruling
pursuant to § 482. Section 7 is a brief statement of the effect that
the draft Rev. Proc. would have on other documents issued by the
Service. The last section, section 8, provides information as to
contact persons within the Office of Associate Chief Counsel
(International), to whom inquiries may be directed and comments
forwarded.
III. PURPOSE OF THE REVENUE PROCEDURE
The purpose of the revenue procedure is to provide instructions
and procedures which are to be employed by the taxpayer in
seeking an advance determination ruling ("ADR") from the Office
of Associate Chief Counsel (International). If the ADR issues from
the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (International), it will
provide prospective application of § 482 to the class of
international transactions of the foreign or domestic taxpayers
which have submitted their request.
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IV. SCOPE OF THE ADVANCE DETERMINATION RULING
An advance determination ruling (ADR) is available for any
issue encompassing the application of § 482, with respect to any
apportionments and/or allocations of gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among two or more
organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by the same interest." While the draft Rev. Proc.
provides for broad application of the advance determination ruling
procedure, it is expected that the procedure would be most
frequently used with, respect to transfer pricing issues or cost
sharing arrangements between or among affiliated corporations. 2
The Internal Revenue Service has broad discretion in refusing
to consider an advance determination request and similarly has
broad discretion in refusing to issue a ruling notwithstanding the
fact that it may have agreed to consider the ADR request.
Decisions with respect to ADR requests are not announced in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin (IRB). The draft Rev. Proc. suggests that
future revenue procedures may address the situations for which
ADRs will not be considered. 3
V. FOUNDATIONS FOR THE REVENUE PROCEDURE ON
ADVANCE DETERMINATION RULINGS
The Internal Revenue Service recognizes that international
transfer pricing cases, in examination, frequently result in lengthy
and expensive administrative appeals, litigation and competent
authority proceedings. 4 The purpose of the ADR procedure is to
reduce the uncertainties and improve predictability for both the
taxpayer and the government arising out of international
transactions and, simultaneously, to ease the cost burden and
11. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90- § 2.01, reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
12. Id
13. Id. at § 2.02.
14. Id. at § 3.01 Competent authority proceedings involve negotiated resolution of tax issues
arising from conflicting tax policy of two or more nations which result in, inter alia, double taxation
of a taxpayer.
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expense of examination necessary to resolve transfer pricing
controversies for both the taxpayer and the governments involved
(in the case of competent authority proceedings).' 5 The goal of the
ADR process is to reach an agreement between the Service and the
taxpayer on an appropriate method, pursuant to § 482, for
determining transfer pricing or cost-sharing agreements of control
taxpayers.16 The draft revenue procedure recognizes that, given
the highly technical factual nature of international transactions and
the sometimes inconsistent views of the parties with an interest in
the structure of multinational inter-company transactions, the ADR
procedure may not be appropriate in certain situations.17
The advance determination ruling procedure will require that
the taxpayer submit to the Service a request for a ruling on a
proposed method to apply to a transaction pursuant to § 482. The
method advanced by the taxpayer must have the objective of
reaching a clear reflection of income of the taxpayer and all or
some of its affiliates with respect to all or some of the inter-
company transactions. The requirements to be met by the taxpayer
are set forth in section 4 of the draft Rev. Proc.,' 8 and the
technical form of the submission is set forth in section 5.19
The Internal Revenue Service will judge the request after
analyzing the information supplied by the taxpayer together with
other relevant information. 0 The Service will review the
submission and, if necessary, discuss it with the taxpayer, and, if
found acceptable, issue a ruling concerning the applicability of the
proposed method with respect to § 482 allocations.2' As will be
discussed in greater detail below, the ADR may also include
agreements between competent authorities, a result which could be
of great comfort to a taxpayer.
15. Id.
16. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-.._ § 3.01 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 22-83 and accompanying text (discussing section 4 of the draft Rev. Proc.).
19. See infra notes 84-126 and accompanying text (discussing section 5 of the draft Rev.
Proc.).
20. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-.. § 3.02(b) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
21. Id.
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VI. CONTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ADVANCE
DETERMINATION RULING AS SET FORTH IN
THE DRAFT REVENUE PROCEDURE
The proposed advance determination, pursuant to § 482, will
be issued in the form of a ruling (hence, Advance Determination
Ruling).22 Given that the terms and conditions of an Advance
Determination Ruling (ADR) are satisfied, the method of
distribution, apportionment or allocation of gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among the
organizations, trades, or businesses specified in the ruling (the
"apportionment method" where relevant, this term also refers to
a "cost sharing arrangement") will be deemed to clearly reflect the
income of such organizations, trades or businesses within the
meaning of § 482 and the regulations pertinent thereto. The parties
are precluded from relying on the ruling for tax years not
encompassed by the ruling or for transactions or parties not
encompassed within the ruling, unless mutually agreed upon
otherwise. The fact that the taxpayer did or did not request an ADR
pursuant to the revenue procedure, or the fact that the taxpayer
proposed a particular apportionment method, is not to be introduced
or relied on by either the taxpayer or the Service in subsequent
administrative or judicial proceedings unless the parties have
agreed otherwise.23
The proposed apportionment method submitted must be
generally consistent with the principals of § 482 and the regulations
thereunder. The Service will consider other economic approaches,
even though not specifically mentioned in the § 482 regulations,
where such methods clearly reflect income. 24 The draft Rev. Proc.
cites, as an example of other methods which might be considered,
a formulary approach which uniquely applies to the specific facts
and circumstances of a taxpayer in a particular transaction.2 ' The
22. Id. at § 4.01.
23. Id. at § 4.02.
24. Id. at § 4.03.
25. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 4.03 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
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fundamental requirement is that the method agreed upon should be
the most "reasonable". The method should clearly reflect income,
be supported by the best available and reliable data, require few
adjustments, and be properly and presumably easily
administered.26 The taxpayer bears the burden of applying the
foregoing principles to the proposed apportionment method, and the
application of those principles must be fully explained in the
taxpayer's request for a ruling, as set forth in § 5.06.27
For supporting data, the parties may agree upon specific
economic measurements, accepted by the Service, of selected
independent competitors to support a range of appropriate transfer
prices which take into account the taxpayer's particular situation.
For each ADR request, the taxpayer must, to the extent possible,
identify comparable competitors:28
Where comparable competitors do not exist, or are not
readily found, the taxpayer must to the extent possible
identify the types of businesses that are similar to the
taxpayer's, though not directly comparable. The taxpayer
has the burden of documenting the research efforts
undertaken to obtain the information required pursuant to
this paragraph as set forth in §§ 5.07 and 5.08 (emphasis
added).29
The taxpayer is not to be excluded from the ADR process
merely because direct comparables or similar businesses do not
exist. However a taxpayer, in the absence of such direct
comparables or similar businesses, would bear the burden of
demonstrating that the proposed apportionment method adequately
fits the facts of the taxpayer's operations and that the
apportionment method satisfies the requirements of § 4.03.30
Agreement reached on the application and operation of an
apportionment method is to be based on the critical assumptions,
26. Id.
27. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing section 5.06).
28. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 4.04 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
29. Id. See infra notes 111-18 (discussing section 5.07 of the proposed Rev. Proc.). See also
infra note 119 and accompanying text (reviewing section 5.08).
30. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90- § 4.04 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
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data and computations. The taxpayer bears the burden of
establishing, upon subsequent examination, that the data and
computations are correct and that the critical assumptions remain
valid and that each was consistently applied pursuant to the
agreement in the term of the ruling. 1
If the taxpayer's actual operations remain within the agreed-
upon parameters set forth in the ruling, the Service will not propose
adjustments pursuant to § 482 to the transactions covered by the
ruling during the ruling period.32
If the actual results fall outside the limits specified by the
parameters, but within acceptable limits of variability, the taxpayer
may make adjustments following the close of the taxable year to
bring the pricing for the transactions back within the agreed-upon
limits stated in the rulings.3 Variability of the aforementioned
parameters will be in the form of either a specified permitted
percentage deviation or a monetary amount of deviation.34 The
procedures for making the adjustment following the close of the
taxable year and establishing the account receivable are those
provided in the guidelines of Rev. Proc. 65-17, 1965-1 C.B. 833. 35
The application of the principles by the taxpayer as stated in
paragraphs 4.04(a)-(d) to the proposed apportionment method is to
be fully explained in the taxpayer's request for a ruling, as required
by § 5.06.6 On an annual basis, the taxpayer's compliance with
§ 4.04(b)-(d) must be fully explained and documented in the annual
report required pursuant to § 4.09.37
The ADR is to be effective prospectively, generally for the
taxable years beginning after the date of the ruling.38 The initial
term of the ruling is to be negotiated with the Service, but
31. Id. at § 4.04(b).
32. Id. at § 4.04(c).
33. Id. at § 4.04(d).
34. Id
35. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90._ § 4.04(d) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990). See draft Rev.
Proc. 65-17, 1965-1 C.B. 833.
36. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-- § 4.04(b) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
37. Id at § 4.04(0. For a discussion of § 4.09, see infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
38. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90- § 4.05(a) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
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generally the term is not to exceed three years.39 The actual
duration of the ruling is dependent upon the type of industry,
product, or transaction involved.
The ADR procedure contemplates renewal upon mutual
agreement of the parties. The taxpayer's request to renew must be
accompanied by a newer, updated, study, analysis and supporting
documentation.4" The request to renew may be made at any time
prior to the expiration of the initial term of the briginal ruling or,
presumably, any subsequent renewed ruling. The request for
renewal is to follow the procedures for annual reports as set forth
in § 4.09.4 1
If the taxpayer fails to comply with the terms and conditions
stated in the rulings, or if there is a misrepresentation or omission
of material facts in the request for a ruling, subsequent submissions
or annual reports, the ruling may be revoked by the Service.42
Additional taxes, interest and penalties may be assessed as if the
ruling had never existed where a ruling is revoked for cause such
as taxpayer noncompliance or misrepresentation or the omission of
material facts.43 More importantly, in a case of revocation, the
"egregious case" provision of Rev. Rul. 80-231 may apply to the
foreign tax credit resulting from any adjustment under § 482
relating to any transactions covered by the revoked ruling."
Furthermore, if a ruling is revoked, application of Rev. Proc. 65-17
may be denied in appropriate cases.4 If the Service determines
that the taxpayer is entitled to the relief provided by Rev. Proc. 65-
39. Id. at § 4.05(b).
40. Id. at § 4.05(c).
41. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing section 4.09 of the draft Rev.
Proc.).
42. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 4.05(d) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
43. Id.
44. Id. The "'egregious case" provisions noted above are found in draft Rev. Rul. 80-231,
1980-2 C.B. 219.
45. Rev. Proc. 65-17, provides the position of the Internal Revenue Service and the procedures
to be followed in cases in which the United States taxpayer, whose taxable income has been
increased for a taxable year by reason of an allocation under § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code,
requests permission to receive payment from the entity from, or to, which the allocation of income
or of deductions, was made of an amount equal to a part or all of the amount allocated, without
further federal income tax consequences. Rev. Proc. 65-17, 1965-1 C.B. 833.
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17, interest on the account receivable due under § 40.03 of Rev.
Proc. 65-17, or its foreign equivalent, may not be subject to mutual
agreement for correlative relief. In the event of revocation for
cause, the taxpayer may apply for § 7805(b) relief in accordance
with instructions in Rev. Proc. 87-4.46 In such situations, the
taxpayer bears the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the
Service that the terms and conditions of the ruling were
substantially complied with and all material facts were disclosed
and properly stated. So asserting, the taxpayer must make an
affirmative showing of all the facts alleged as a reasonable cause.
Revocation for cause will be based on overall compliance and
presentation of the facts.47 Although not an item by item
determination, the failure of one significant item could be sufficient
grounds for revocation. The effective date of the revocation will be
set forth in the Service's notification to the taxpayer. A revocation,
as set forth above, will, in addition, be coordinated with appropriate
competent authorities.
Where the critical assumptions (specific triggering events)
underlying the ADR change in a manner that causes the
determination to be unfair or unworkable, the taxpayer and the
Service may enter into discussions to revise the ruling, or the ruling
may be canceled by the Service (or with the consent of the
Service). Examples of such a fundamental change would be a
significant change in business operations or a substantial
uncontrolled economic event.48 Of course, it might be noted here,
it is exactly such a change in fundamental circumstances that
taxpayers planning such a transaction might well hope for,
46. Id. Section 7805(b) empowers the secretary to prescribe the extent, if any, to which any
ruling or regulation relating to the Internal Revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect
(emphasis added). I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1986). Rev. Proc. 87-4 provides, generally, for procedures for
obtaining rulings, closing agreements, and information letters on federal tax issues under the
jurisdiction of the Associate Chief Counsel (International) and provides information concerning
determination letters under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner (International) and the
District Directors. The Associate Chief Counsel (International) is responsible for the uniform
interpretation and application of the federal income tax laws and income tax treaties relating to
international transactions. Rev. Proc. 87-4, 1987-1 C.B. 529.
47. Id.
48. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90- § 4.05(e) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
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particularly, for instance, where the transaction might involve the
development of a new market and the parties anticipate the
generation of significant profits abroad, based upon the transfer
price, (fully fair at the time of transfer) in the face of a nascent
market. The revision or cancellation of a ruling will be coordinated
with appropriate competent authorities. Critical assumptions are to
be defined in the ruling. The taxpayer may notify the Service that
a change in a critical assumption has taken place at any time
during the year giving rise to the event, but no later than the date
for filing the annual report for that year. Together with the
notification, the taxpayer must provide all supporting
documentation and a request to cancel or revise the prior ruling.
The mailing instructions for a request to revise or cancel a ruling
are set forth in the procedures for annual reports noted in § 4.09.49
The existing ruling is to remain in effect until the stated expiration
date unless the Service and taxpayer (and, where appropriate, the
involved competent authorities) agree to the terms of a revised
ruling. The effective date for the revised ruling is to be stated in
the modified or new ruling.5" If the parties are not able to
successfully negotiate the terms of the revised ruling, or if it would
not be appropriate to issue a revised ruling, the Service will specify
the effective date of cancellation in its notifice to the taxpayer.51
The effective date will be no earlier than the beginning of the tax
year encompassing the event causing the cancellation and no later
than the date of that event.52 A change of critical assumptions
resulting from actions within the control of the taxpayer and not
initiated for compelling business purposes will be deemed non-
compliance with the meaning of '§ 4.05(d).53
If actual operating results for the year fall outside the specified
limits, noted above in § 4.04(d), a change in critical assumptions
49. For a discussion of § 4.09, see infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
50. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-... § 4.05(e) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
51. let
52. Id.
53. Id. For a discussion of § 4.05(d), s&'supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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will be deemed to have occurred and the ruling will be subject to
cancellation or revision under the guidelines of § 4.05(e).5 4
The Internal Revenue Service has the right to request the
taxpayer to supply any and all additional information related to the
taxpayer's activities, products, industry, and countries of operation
that it deems necessary in order to arrive at a mutually agreeable
basis for a ruling.55 The Service may request the taxpayer to
provide, at the taxpayer's own expense, an independent expert or
independent experts, mutually acceptable to the taxpayer and the
Service (and, where necessary, the appropriate competent
authorities) to review and evaluate the taxpayer's proposed
apportionment method.56 Instructions for the use of independent
experts are provided at § 6.08. 5' The evaluation of the taxpayer's
proposal by the Service is not to constitute an examination or an
inspection of the taxpayer's books and records, as provided under
§ 7605(b).58
If one or more of the parties to a ruling undertakes operations
within a foreign country which has a tax treaty with the United
States, the ruling may include one or more mutual agreements
between or among competent authorities. The subject of the
competent authority agreement will be the proposed apportionment
method.59 The taxpayer will share the responsibility of working
out the terms of the agreement with the involved foreign
governmental authorities in a manner coordinated with the
Service.'
In order to facilitate bilateral negotiations with respect to
competent authority agreements, the full cooperation of the
54. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-.._ § 4.05(e) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990). For a
discussion of § 4.05(e), see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
55. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90- § 4.06 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing section 6.08).
58. Pursuant to § 7605(b) which states that no taxpayer shall be subjected unnecessary
examination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be
made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise, or unless the secretary, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary. I.R.C. §
7605(b) (1986).
59. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90... § 4.07(a) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
60. Id
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taxpayer under the standards of Rev. Proc. 82-29, is required.6 1
The taxpayer must consent to the disclosure of all relevant data to
the involved treaty partners. However, the taxpayer may assert that
the disclosure of confidential matters, such as trade secrets, may
substantially harm the taxpayer's competitive position, if released.
If the taxpayer requests, the parties shall attempt to negotiate a
mechanism to permit verification by a competent authority without
exposing the trade secrets or other proprietary information of the
taxpayer. 2
It is not mandatory that the taxpayer's request for a ruling be
contingent upon reaching a Competent Authority Agreement. Under
certain circumstances, the Service may consider issuing such a
ruling to a taxpayer without having first reached a Competent
Authority Agreement. Circumstances in which a Competent
Authority Agreement may not be deemed necessary may include
transactions with a non-treaty country or a request by the taxpayer
for a unilateral understanding where the taxpayer can show good
and sufficient justification for such a ruling.63 If the Service issues
such a ruling and the taxpayer has activities with a related party in
a treaty country, the regular competent authority procedures as
established in Rev. Proc. 82-29 will apply if double taxation occurs
as a result of the taxpayer's compliance with the terms of the
ruling.' The fact that the competent authorities fail to reach a
mutual agreement shall not be deemed to be sufficient evidence
under § 1.901-2(e)(5) of the regulations that the taxpayer has
exhausted all effective and practical remedies to reduce the
61. Rev. Proc. 82-29 explains the procedures to be used by the Internal Revenue Service and
taxpayers in certain cases of double taxation that are governed by income tax treaties of the United
States. The cases covered by this revenue procedure concern the allocation of income and deductions
between a United States taxpayer and a related person (including a branch office) subject to the
taxing jurisdiction of a country ("treaty country") that has entered into an income tax treaty with the
United States. See Rev. Proc. 82-89, 1982-1 C.B. 481.
62. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-... §4.07(b) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
63. Id. at § 4.07(c).
64. Id.
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taxpayer's liability pursuant to the foreign tax audit adjustment.65
If such a ruling is issued, any affected foreign competent authority
which has a mutual agreement with the United States competent
authority covering the ADR process will be notified of the
existence of the ruling in accord with appropriate tax treaty
provisions.
VII. ADVANCE DETERMINATION RULINGS:
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The taxpayer is required to file an annual report containing all
data including economic accounting and tax data sufficient to detail
the results for the year to demonstrate compliance with the terms
and conditions of the ruling.66
The annual report is required to be sent to the District Director
or the Assistant Commissioner (International) that has or would
have examination jurisdiction over the return or the returns of the
control group within 120 days after the close of the taxable year.
In any event, a duplicate copy of the annual report is to be sent to
the Associate Chief Counsel (International). 67 The taxpayer is
required to attach a copy of the annual report to its tax return for
65. Regulation § 1.901-2(e)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that an amount paid is not a
compulsory payment, and thus is not an amount of tax paid, to the extent that the amount paid
exceeds the amount of liability under foreign law for tax. An amount paid does not exceed the
amount of such liability if the amount paid is determined by the taxpayer in a manner that is
consistent with a reasonable interpretation and application of the substantive and procedural
provisions of foreign law (including applicable tax treaties) in such a way as to reduce, over time,
the taxpayer's reasonably expected liability under foreign law for tax, and if the taxpayer exhausts
all effective and practical r9 medies, including invocation of competent authority procedures available
under applicable tax treaties, to reduce over time, the taxpayer's liability for foreign tax (including
liability pursuant to a foreign tax audit adjustment). Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5) (1990).
66. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-. § 4.09(a) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
67. lAt
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the taxable year covered in the annual report.68 The annual report
is subject to the penalties of § 7203 and § 7206.6
The annual reports must address the requirements of § 4.04, §
4.05(c), (e) and (f), § 5.01, § 5.02(d), § 5.03(c)-(e), § 5.05 (but
only as to data as cited in the ADR), §§ 5.06-5.08 (but only if
representations have changed or as agreed to in the ADR), and §
5.12 and § 5.13.70 The annual report, when received, is to be
reviewed by the Service for any actions which might require
immediate attention, such as requests to renew or cancel. The
guidelines for processing such requests are contained in § 6.71
The Service's processing activities are to be coordinated
between the Field and the National Office with the taxpayer (and,
if appropriate, with the involved competent authorities). 72 If the
Field deems it necessary to evaluate or verify the representations
made in the annual report (for example, representations pursuant to
§ 4.04(b), § 4.05(d), and § 4.10(b) the guidelines provided in §
6.05 are to be followed.7' The contact which might occur between
the Service and the taxpayer for the purpose of clarifying and/or
verifying the information contained in the annual report is not to
constitute an examination of the taxpayer as stated in § 7605(b). 74
68. Id. at § 4.09(b). The address for sending the duplicate copy to the Associate Chief Counsel
(International) is: Associate Chief Counsel (International) CC: INTL FO, Internal Revenue Service,
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room 3501, Washington D.C. U.S.A. 20224.
69. ld Generally, § 7203 provides that any person required... to pay any estimated tax or
tax, or required ... by regulations... to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information,
who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply
such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than one year,
or, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. I.R.C. § 7203 (1986).
Section 7206 provides that any person who falsely declares under penalty of perjury or aids
or assists or procures counsel or advises the preparation or presentation of any document, return,
affidavit, or claim which is fraudulent or false as to any material matter... shall be guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a
corporation) or imprisoned not more than three years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7206 (1986).
70. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-._._ § 4.09(d) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
71. For a discussion of § 6, see infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
72. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_. § 4.09(e) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
73. ld
74. Id at § 4.09(f).
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The Internal Revenue Service is empowered to conduct a complete
examination of the operation of the pricing mechanism as outlined
in the ADR.75
In determining a taxpayer's liability arising under the ADR, the
Field will ascertain whether (1) the terms and conditions stated in
the ruling have been properly complied with by the taxpayer, (2)
the taxpayer's representations upon which the ruling and the annual
reports were based reflected an accurate statement of all material
facts, and (3) the transactions were actually carried out substantially
as proposed in the ADR (for example, critical assumptions have not
changed).76 The general examination guidelines are provided in §
4.04(b), § 4.05(d), and § 4.09(d) of the draft revenue procedure.
The examination at this point is not to be considered a reevaluation
of the acceptability of the previously agreed-upon apportionment
method."
The taxpayer is required to retain all records which it relied
upon in reaching the ADR and all supporting data referred to in its
annual reports with respect to the ADR.78 The ADR may specify
the record retention. Otherwise, records are required to be kept as
long as they are relevant.79 Upon examination, any records
pertaining to the ruling are to be made available to the Service
upon request within 60 days and any foreign base company data
along with appropriate translations within 120 days. The fact that
a foreign jurisdiction may impose a penalty upon the taxpayer or
other person for disclosing the material will not constitute
reasonable cause for noncompliance with the Service's request, a
fact which could very well create consternation for many
taxpayers.80
If the Field believes that an ADR should be revised, canceled,
or revoked because the taxpayer has failed to meet the above
75. Iat at § 4.10(a).
76. Id. at § 4.10(b).
77. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-._ § 4.10(b) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
78. Id. at § 4.10(c). Sections 4.04,4.06, 4.09(a), 5.01-5.09, and 6.02 of this proposed revenue
procedure provide the general guidelines for the retention of records.
79. d. See I.R.C. § 6001 and the Regulations thereunder.
80. Id.
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requirements, the findings and recommendations will be forwarded
to the National Office following the procedures for requesting
technical advice. Otherwise the ruling is required to be applied by
the Field in determining the taxpayer's liability.8'
As a condition to the issuance of the ruling and for the years
covered by the ruling, the taxpayer may be required to agree to the
extension of any statute of limitations for a mutually agreed-upon
period of time for any returns subsequently examined, where the
Field cannot complete an examination of the pricing mechanism
contained in the ruling before the expiration of the statutory
period. 2
Where a mutual agreement exists between the respective
competent authorities covering the apportionment method of the
taxpayer, to the extent possible the Service will attempt to
coordinate the examination of the operation of the pricing
mechanism contained in the ADR with such foreign countries.8 3
VIII. THE FoRM AND CONTENT OF ADVANCED
DETERMINATION RULING REQUESTS
As set forth below, requests for an advanced determination
ruling are to provide the following information which is required
to be organized to correspond with the instructions which will be
detailed below. If a request is not sufficiently specific, or does not
have the requisite detail, it will not be considered. If the
information required is not applicable to the requests, the taxpayer
bears the burden of providing a statement to that fact and adequate
justification. 4
Materials which are submitted pursuant to the ADR requests
become part of the Service's file and are not to be returned to the
taxpayer. Thus, it is suggested that original documents not be
submitted. 5
81. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-... § 4.10(d) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
82. Id. at § 4.10(e).
83. Id at § 4.10(0.
84. Id. at § 5.01(a).
85. It at § 5.01(b).
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Copies of all contracts, agreements, instruments, economic
studies and other documents relating to the transaction are required
to accompany the request. If the supporting records or documents
are too voluminous for transmittal with the request, the taxpayer
will sufficiently incorporate the items by reference in the request
and certify that the items exist at the time the request is submitted,
stating where the items are located and whom the Service can
contact to secure the items if deemed necessary, and stating that the
items will be made available to the Service upon request.8 6
Documents supporting the requests must be accompanied by a
narration of all material facts and an analysis of their relevance to
the issue or issues involved in the ADR requests.1
7
Relevant documents originally published in a foreign language
are required to be submitted with a certified English translation,
although no guidance is provided as to what would constitute a
sufficient certification for the purposes of fulfilling this
requirement.1
8
IX. REQUIRED FoRM AND CONTENT OF ADR REQUEST
The paragraphs which follow will outline in detail the form
and content of requests for an advanced determination ruling.
Reviewing these requirements, the reader will become impressed
with the quality and quantity of materials necessary and, as noted
above, the information required certainly approaches, in an
asymptotic sense, the limits of that information which would
constitute "perfect information" in the sense of Pareto optimality.
Each ADR request is required to contain a complete statement
of the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and tax identification
numbers (TINs) of the controlled taxpayers 9 which are parties to
the advanced determination ruling."
86. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-. § 5.01(c) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
87. Id. at § 5.01(d).
88. Id. at § 5.01(e).
89. "Controlled taxpayers" here as defined in the regulations pursuant to § 482.
90. Prop. Rev. Proe. 90-- § 5.02(a) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
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The requests are required to contain a general history of the
business operations, a description of the world-wide organizational
structure, ownership, principal businesses, and the place or places
where such businesses are conducted, major transaction flows, and
significant transfer pricing arrangements or practices in effect
which may have a bearing on the current or proposed
apportionment method for all members of the controlled group
regardless of whether such controlled group members are parties to
the request.9
The discussion provided above must state whether any of the
parties to the request have pricing arrangements with any other
related or unrelated entity that are or may be similar to the current
or proposed apportionment methods cited in the request for which
an ADR has not been sought. Any such other entity is required to
be identified in the pricing arrangement explained.92
Where it is reasonably anticipated that independent expert
opinion may be requested by the Service, the taxpayer must submit,
as part of the ADR request, the names of at least two independent
experts for each country including the United States involved in the
proposed apportionment method, consistent with the instructions of
§ 6.08.
Each ADR request must discuss any relevant statutory
provisions, tax treaties, court decisions, regulations, revenue rulings
or revenue procedures that significantly relate to the current or
proposed apportionment method.94
All requests are required to disclose and explain the taxpayer's
and the government's positions on previous and current issues at
the examination, appeals, court, or competent authority levels
which are related to the current or proposed apportionment method.
The same information must be supplied for any similar
circumstances involving foreign tax authorities.
95
91. Id. at § 5.02(b).
92. Id. at § 5.02(c).
93. Id. at § 5.02(d). For a discussion of § 6.08 see infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
94. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90._ § 5.03(a) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
95. Id. at § 5.03(b).
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Requests must also state whether identical or similar requests
have been submitted for a ruling to the Service by the taxpayer, its
predecessor, or any related party. If such is the case, the statement
must specify the date of submission, withdrawal, or determination
and other details of the Service's consideration of the previous
request or requests.
96
If, following the filing of the request, but before a ruling is
issued, the taxpayer knows that an examination of the issues
addressed in the request has been started by the Field, the taxpayer
must notify the National Office of such action. This same
information is required to be supplied for similar circumstances
involving the foreign tax authorities.97 All requests are required
to provide the location of the field office that has or will have
examination or appeals jurisdiction over the returns of the group.9
The ADR request is required to contain a complete discussion
of the current apportionment methodologies that have a bearing on
the request which are used by the members of the control group
who are parties to the request. This discussion should describe any
apportionment and allocation of gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances; principal transaction flows; transfer pricing
arrangements or practices, including the basis for establishing the
current transfer price and the net profit apportionment; and all
tangibles, intangibles, and services currently subject to
apportionment methods which may have a bearing on the
apportionment method. If intangibles are involved, the discussion
should include reference to developed and acquired intangibles. For
acquired intangibles, the underlying documentation must be
provided.99
The ADR request is required to detail the base of the proposed
apportionment method; that is, the organizations, trades, or
businesses (the "parties") and the transactions that will be subject
to it."
96. Id. at § 5.03(c).
97. Id. at § 5.03(d).
98. Ia at § 5.03(e).
99. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 5.04 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
100. Id at § 5.05(a).
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Summarized financial and tax data of the parties from the last
three years must be provided, including sales, cost of goods sold,
operating expenses, profit before taxes, assets, liabilities, number
of employees and other relevant data."01 The request must supply
the statutory and effective tax rates of each foreign country
involved, the functional currency and taxable year of each party to
the request102. A brief description of the significant accounting
(GAAP) methods employed by the parties to the ADR which may
have a bearing on the proposed apportionment method is required
to be provided.10 3 Any significant accounting (GAAP) and tax
accounting differences between the U.S. and the foreign countries
which may be involved and which have a bearing on the proposed
apportionment method must be explained.' °
Tax returns, financial statements, annual reports and other
pertinent U.S. and foreign government filings (for example,
customs reports); existing pricing, distribution or licensing
agreements; company-wide accounting procedures, business
segment reports, budgets and projections and other relevant data
(such as business plans and world-wide product line or business
segment profitability reports) which may have a bearing on
apportionment method must be cited in the taxpayer's proposal and
made available to the Service upon request.10"
The ADR request is required to provide a detailed explanation
and an analysis of the proposed apportionment method as outlined
earlier in § 4.03106 and § 4.04.107 If more than one pricing
arrangement is involved in the request, separate detailed discussions
are required. The proposed apportionment method must be
101. Id at § 5.05(b). The required other relevant data is the type of information contained on
Form 5471, Information Report with Respect to a Foreign Corporation, and Form 5472, Information
Report of a Foreign Corporation.
102. Id. at § 5.05(c).
103. Id at § 5.05(d).
104. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-..... § 5.05(e) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
105. Id at § 5.05(0.
106. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing section 4.03 of the draft Rev.
Proc.).
107. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (explaining section 4.04).
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illustrated by applying it to the prior three years' financial and tax
data of the parties.108
Each ADR request is required to establish the conformity of
the proposed apportionment method to the "clear reflection"
standard of § 482 and the "arms-length" standard of income tax
treaties. The taxpayer is required to apply the general guidelines
contained in the regulation under § 482 for the pricing method
proposed and, in addition, supply data specific to the pricing
method under paragraphs (a) through (h) below. Where the
volatility of the industry makes a single year's data less reliable
because of the peculiarity of the business cycle or the product life,
the Service may request the information specified in this section for
the years covered in § 5.06 of this revenue procedure or for such
period as may be necessary. Where the proposed apportionment
method is a cost-sharing arrangement, the instructions of §
5.08"09 are to be followed.110
To be included in the request are all pertinent measurements
of profitability and return on investment (for example, gross profit
margin, gross income/total operating expenses (the BERRY ratio),
net profit margin, or return on assets) for the parties to the request
which will serve as the basis for competitor comparability.'
The ADR request is required to provide a functional analysis
of the role of each party involved in the pricing arrangement,
setting forth the economic activities performed, the assets
employed, the economic costs incurred, and the risks assumed.'
The ADR request is required to provide an economic analysis
or study of the general industry pricing practices and economic
functions performed within the markets and geographical areas to
be covered by the ruling.113
The request is required to provide a statement of all pertinent
measures of profitability within the general industry for the factors
108. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 5.06 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
109. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (examining section 5.08).
110. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-. § 5.07 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
111. Id at § 5.07(a).
112. Id. at § 5.07(b).
113. Id. at § 5.07(c).
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selected under subsection (a) above. These data are to provide the
Service the industry perspective within which the taxpayer operates
but may not necessarily be adequate support for a proposed pricing
method. 114
The Advanced Determination Ruling is required to provide a
list of the taxpayer's competitors and a discussion of any business
or types of businesses that are similar to the taxpayer's, even
though not comparable, as well as research efforts, underlying
financial data and screening criteria used to identify comparable
competitors" 5.
Included is to be a detailed presentation of comparability
criteria used to identify independent competitors. The proposed
repertoire provides an example of the types of adjustments which
could be made to selected independent competitors' activities to
create parity with the activities of the entities covered by the
request. These include: segregating lines of business activities
performed; accounting differences; functional differences relating
to activities performed (marketing), assets employed (inventories
and receivables), or risks (currency fluctuations) and costs
(warranty) incurred; volume or scale differences; differing market
penetration (allowances granted and product demand differences);
market level of operations; product maturation; terms of sale
(including freight insurance, shipping, and financing); and
capitalization (debt/equity ratios)." 6
The ADR application is required to include development of
profitability measures under subsection (a) above for independently
comparable competitors under subsection (e), also above, based on
adjustments pursuant to subsection (f) above. 117 Also to be
included is the development of profitability measurement ranges of
selected comparable competitors under subsection (g) above. This
analysis is to include identification of competitors with economic
activities performed, assets employed (including intangibles), and
114. Id. at § 5.07(d).
115. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 5.07(e) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
116. lit at § 5.07(0.
117. IXt at § 5.07(g).
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economic costs and risk incurred which are comparable to the
taxpayer's. The profitability ranges should reflect the inherent
factors of the product, business, industry market or taxpayer.118
The taxpayer is required to apply the general guidelines contained
in the regulations under § 482 for a cost sharing arrangement
proposal. The information requested above in §§ 5.01 through 5.06
are to be provided when appropriate.
In addition, the ADR draft Rev. Proc. requires that the
following information be submitted to establish that the cost
sharing arrangements result in a clear reflection of income:
(a) The date that the arrangement commenced, the date
that the arrangement was reduced to writing, and
the date each participant entered the arrangement;
if there is a written arrangement, it must be
provided along with any agreements, amendments,
addenda, and exhibits;
(b) Whether the service has examined the arrangement
(if there has been an examination, see § 5.03(b) of
the proposed Rev. Proc. for instructions);
(c) The history of the business operations, the
geographic locations and principal business
activities (for example, manufacturing or marketing)
of each of the participants in the arrangement (as
provided in § 5.02(a) of this proposed Rev. Proc.);
(d) Each participant's original contribution to the
arrangement, tangible and intangible;
(e) Whether royalties or other amounts based on the
value of contributing intangibles were paid to the
participants who contributed to them;
(f) Whether the arrangement provides for research and
development to be conducted in general product
areas, processes, or services or just for the research
and development of specific products (any
documents describing the technical scope of the
developmental efforts, together with documentation
118. d at § 5.07(h).
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which explains the relationship between the
participants' businesses and the expected use of the
results of the developmental efforts must be
provided);
(g) How each participant's benefit or expected benefit
can be measured (by any relationship agreements
between the participants) must be provided;
(h) Which developmental costs are to be shared or
excluded (for example, costs associated with
abandoned projects; costs associated with specific
stages of product development; and relevant labor,
material, and overhead costs; how the division of
costs is based (for example, on units of production,
budgeted sales, actual sales, or number of years
until the research and development will be used);
any relationship agreements between the parties
must be provided);
(i) The ownership rights of each participant in the
research and development, how these rights relate
to the tangibles and intangible contributions of the
participants to the arrangement;
(j) Whether there have been changes in the
arrangement since its inception (for example, with
respect to participants, products, or product areas
covered; the estimation of benefits; the inclusion,
exclusion, or division of costs; or the assignments
of rights to the research and development) (if there
have been any changes, the dates and substance of
the changes and any documents explaining the
changes must be provided);
(k) Whether the participants have established
procedures for periodically estimating the benefits
that each will receive from the research and
development and for adjusting each participant's
share of costs accordingly;
(1) The accounting procedures used to determine each
entity's contribution to the costs of the research and
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development, and whether these procedures have
been uniformly followed (pursuant to §§ 5.05(b)
and (e) of the proposed Rev. Proc.);
(m) How the cost sharing payments made and received
have been treated for U.S. tax purposes;
(n) Each participant's gross and net profitability
(historical and projected) with regard to the product
area covered by the arrangement together with an
analysis of sales to related and unrelated parties,
costs incurred, costs shared, and results of
developmental efforts (pursuant to instructions
provided in §§ 5.05(b) and (f) and § 5.06 of the
proposed Rev. Proc.);
(o) How the arrangement provides for the buy-in of
any new participants, or the expansion of an
existing participant's rights, and for repurchasing
the rights of a participant that withdraws from the
arrangement, or of a participant that will not be
using its rights in the active conduct of its trade or
business (for example, a participant who will
simply be selling or licensing its rights in any
intangible property produced);
(p) Whether any payments are made for contract
research, the manner in which such payments are
accounted for by the participants, and how such
payments are treated for U.S. tax purposes;
(q) Whether any payments are received from third
parties for the licensing or selling of intangible
property developed through the arrangement and
how such payments are treated for U.S. tax
purposes;
(r) Whether comparable or similar arrangements
between related or unrelated parties exist and the
research efforts undertaken to secure this
information (pursuant to instructions provided in §§
4.04(a), 5.02(c), and §§ 5.07(e) and (f) of the
proposed revenue procedure);
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(s) Identification of any internal manuals, directives,
guidelines, and similar documents prepared for
accounting, financial or managerial personnel for
purposes of implementing or operating the cost-
sharing arrangement (such as research and
development committee meeting minutes, market
studies, economic impact analyses, capital
expenditure budgets, engineering studies, reports
and studies of trends and profitability in the
industry published by third parties, and financial
analyses for financing and cash flow purposes)
(pursuant to instructions provided in § 5.05(f) of
the proposed revenue procedure)., 9
All ADR requests are required to discuss any domestic tax
issues which would have to be resolved before the proposal is
accepted. The draft Rev. Proc. cites, for example, domestic issues
which may arise from the entry into and the termination of the
ruling. The requests are required to explain how the proposed
apportionment method would interrelate with sub-part (f), the
foreign tax credit, and other relevant provisions of domestic
law. 2° The ADR requests are required to contain a statement as
to which treaty partners are involved with the transactions
described in the request, together with information indicating
whether the taxpayer intends to seek a mutual agreement between
the involved competent authorities.
121
All ADR requests must propose an initial term, renewal
conditions and critical assumptions which, if changed, would cause
the ruling to be revised or canceled."z The request for an ADR
and any supplemental submission regarding the request must be
accompanied by a declaration in the following form:
Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have
examined this request, including accompanying documents,
119. Id. at §§ 5.08(a)-(s).
120. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-... § 5.09 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Intl 565 (1990).
121. Id. at § 5.10.
122. Id. at § 5.11.
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and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts
presented in support of the request for an advanced
determination ruling are true, correct, and complete.
The declaration must be signed by the person or persons on
whose behalf the request is made and not by the taxpayer's
representative. The person signing for a corporate taxpayer must be
an officer of the taxpayer who has personal knowledge of the facts.
The person signing for a trust or a partnership must be a trustee or
a partner who has personal knowledge of the facts.123
A request by or for a taxpayer must be signed by the taxpayer
or the taxpayer's authorized representative. If the request is to be
signed by an authorized representative, the taxpayer is referred to
Rev. Proc. 87-4 as to whom may be properly authorized as a
representative. 124 The requests for ADRs must be submitted in
duplicate to the Associate Chief Counsel (International).1"
The user fee for an ADR is to be $5,000. In this respect, the
draft Rev. Proc. would modify Rev. Proc. 90-17.126 Concurrently
with the submission of the request to the National Office pursuant
to the instructions in § 5.14, the taxpayer is to notify the District
Director or the Assistant Commissioner (International) that has or
will have examination jurisdiction of the return or returns of the
control group that an ADR request has been filed with the office
of Associate Chief Counsel (International).
123. Ma at § 5.12.
124. Id. at § 5.13. See Rev. Proc. 87-4, 1987-1 C.B. 529.
125. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90. § 5.14 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990). The address for
the Associate Chief Counsel (International) is: CC: INPL: FO, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box
7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. U.S.A. 20224. The ADR requests may also be hand-
delivered pursuant to Rev. Proc. 88-4, 1988-1 C.B. 586.
126. Id at § 5.15. Rev. Proc. 90-17 makes certain changes in the user fee program of the
Internal Revenue Service that was established pursuant to Section 10511 of the Revenue Act of 1987
(Title X of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987). The user fee program, which is modified by
Rev. Proc. 90-17, is set forth in Rev. Proc. 89-4, 1989-1 C.B. 767. See Rev. Proc. 90-17, 1990-12
I.R.B. 13.
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X. THE SERVICE'S PROCESSING OF ADR.REQUESTS
Upon receiving the ADR requests, the Service will contact the
taxpayer to discuss any questions regarding the request or any
additional information believed necessary in order to process the
request. The taxpayer will be granted up to 90 days to submit any
additional data or perfect any defects in the requests. If the
National Office does not receive a curative submission within the
90 day period, the file may be closed by the Service. The National
Office will then notify the appropriate field offices of any of the
above activities.127
The Service is to verify and evaluate the supporting data
relevant to the taxpayer's ruling and, if necessary, request
additional information to complete its evaluation of the ruling. The
Service will limit requests for additional information to the subject
matter of the ruling and to data which is needed for the Service's
evaluation of the taxpayer's ruling request. The scope and content
of any additional request will depend upon the completeness of the
taxpayer's supporting data. It is expected that any additional
information requested by the Service will be submitted within the
time period provided or as agreed to between the Service and the
taxpayer. If additional time is needed, an extension of time in
which to submit additional information requested by the Service
may be requested. If the Service does not receive the submission
within the agreed-upon time period, plus any extensions,
negotiations on the request for the ADR may be terminated. The
taxpayer's and the Service's cooperation with the above procedures
is essential to the success of the process.'28
If the Service intends to reject the request, the taxpayer will be
granted a conference. If, after the conference, the Service declines
to consider the request, the taxpayer may request a return of user
fees pursuant to Rev. Proc. 90-17.129 Once the process of
considering a request for an ADR has begun or during the
127. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 6.01 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
128. Id. at § 6.02.
129. lI at § 6.03(a). See Rev. Proc. 90-17, 1990-12 I.R.B. 13.
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renegotiation of an existing ruling, the taxpayer is entitled to a
conference in the National Office. Other conferences may be
proposed and scheduled as circumstances deem necessary. No
conference proposed by the Service will be considered the
taxpayer's "conference of right.""13 A request for an ADR may
be withdrawn at any time before the issuance of a ruling. In those
cases where a Competent Authority Agreement is sought, the
taxpayer may unilaterally withdraw at any time prior to the
conclusion of the Competent Authority Agreement.' The
National Office will notify the involved field offices and, if
appropriate, the United States Competent Authority of activities
noted above. 2
After the request is determined to be complete, the National
Office will refer the request, along with the National Office's views
on any areas that may need development or verification, to the
appropriate field offices for consideration of the taxpayer's request.
If appropriate, where a request involves an entity with activities
within a foreign country that has a tax treaty with the United
States, the National Office will notify the United States Competent
Authority that a request is pending.' In coordination with the
National Office, the Field office will have primary responsibility
for the timely evaluation and verification of the taxpayer's proposal
by evaluating the taxpayer's submission, discussing it with the
taxpayer, verifying the date as supplied by the taxpayer, requesting
additional supporting data from the taxpayer and pursuing other
means or sources of data available to the Service. The Field office
will transmit to the National Office its evaluation of the taxpayer's
request, including any issues arising from verification of the
taxpayer's submitted material, any additional development of
comparable data, any proposed changes to the method, and any
questions or areas of concern (together with appropriate suggested
remedies). 3 4
130. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90- § 6.03(b) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
131. Id. at § 6.03(c).
132. Id. at § 6.03(d).
133. Id. at § 6.04.
134. Id. at § 6.05.
1991 / Legal and Economic Realities of Transfer Pricing
Having received the Field office's comments, the National
Office, the Field and the taxpayer will discuss the acceptability of
the proposals made in the ADR request. As appropriate, the
discussions will be subject to negotiations by the United States
Competent Authority with the involved foreign governments. If the
Service and the taxpayer successfully conclude negotiations, the
Office of Associate Chief Counsel (International) will issue an
ADR on the taxpayer's proposed (or as revised) apportionment
methodologies under § 482. If appropriate, the issuance of the
ruling may be made subject to a mutual agreement with the
involved competent authorities. 35
The taxpayer (the "parties") to the request in coordination
with the Service will be expected to participate in the process by
filing a similar request for an ADR (the foreign equivalent) on the
proposed pricing mechanism with the appropriate foreign
competent authority. In addition, the taxpayer is expected to
cooperate to the extent necessary to conclude a mutual agreement
between the Service and the foreign authority.136 The Service will
attempt in so far as possible to coordinate its evaluation and
verification of the taxpayer's proposal with the involved competent
authorities.'37 Negotiations with the foreign competent authority
are to be initiated as soon as it appears likely that the Service and
the taxpayer will be able to successfully conclude the ADR
process. The Assistant Commissioner (International) is to notify in
a timely and expeditious manner the foreign competent authorities
of the Service's intent to reach a mutual agreement as to the
taxpayer's ADR request after receipt of a memorandum from the
Associate Chief Counsel (International) forwarding the taxpayer's
request to initiate the competent authority process. With respect to
negotiations of ADRs with the involved foreign competent
authorities, the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (International)
will coordinate with the Office of Associate Chief Counsel
135. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-._ § 6.06 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
136. Ida at § 6.07(a).
137. lad at § 6.07(b).
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(International) to ensure a consistent Service position with the
taxpayer. 138
As noted earlier in the discussion with respect to § 4.06 and §
5.0(d) of the draft Rev. Proc., the reasons that the taxpayer is to
provide for one or more independent expert opinions, if requested
by the service during the ADR process, is to reasonably assure the
taxpayer and the Service that the proposed apportionment method
offered by the taxpayer conforms to standard economic principles
and supports and produces a clear reflection of income. 139
A qualified independent expert for purposes of the draft
revenue procedure is one who possesses the requisite education and
experience in the appropriate field of study as well as in the
industry and geographic area relevant to the proposed
apportionment method. The independent expert may not have
participated to any material extent in the development of the initial
proposal, in the preparation of any annual reports relating to the
transactions associated with the current ADR, or in the preparation
of any tax return related to the transactions described in the ADR
for the period covered by the ruling.14
The independent expert is expected to render an opinion that
represents a critical analysis of the taxpayer's apportionment
method proposal. The opinion should comment on the adequacy of
the taxpayer's economic study, address the questions and concerns
raised by the Service, and, if appropriate, be involved with
competent authorities and conclude whether the proposed
apportionment method is supportable and fairly presents the
economic interests of the parties to the ruling and the basis of such
conclusion.141
In addition to providing mutually acceptable independent
experts to review the initial requests, the taxpayer may be required
to provide an independent expert to review the statements and
conclusions in the annual reports required by the ruling. The
138. Id at § 6.07(c).
139. Id. at § 6.08(a).
140. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-. § 6.08(b) reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
141. Id. at § 6.08(c).
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independent expert will be required to compare the actual operating
results for the year to the terms and conditions of the ruling and
render an opinion whether the taxpayer has complied with the
terms and conditions of the ruling and whether the ruling continues
to fairly represent the economic interests of the parties to the ruling
and the basis for that conclusion.142
If an independent expert is necessary, the taxpayer will provide
a waiver under § 6103(c) to the service for the purposes of
discussing a return or return information with the independent
expert. In addition, the taxpayer will be responsible for securing,
in writing, from the independent expert an assurance that the
independent expert is aware of the sanctions under § 7431(a)(2) for
any unauthorized disclosure or use of any return or return
information as defined in § 6103 of the Code. 143
The taxpayer is responsible for assuring that the independent
expert is familiar with the provisions of the revenue procedure and
that any opinion rendered by such independent expert is in
compliance with the requirements of §§ 4, 5, and 6.03 of the draft
revenue procedure.
XI. EFFECT OF THE DRAFT REVENUE
PROCEDURE ON OTHER DocuMENTs
When and if issued, the proposed Rev. Proc. would modify
Rev. Proc. 90-17 to the extent that the draft revenue procedure
142. Id. at § 6.08(d).
143. Id at § 6.08(e). Section 6103 of the Code provides the statutory requirements concerning
the confidentiality and disclosure of returns and return information. It provides, in pertinent part, that
returns and return information are to be confidential and that, except as authorized in the statute, no
officer or employee of the United States or no officer or employee of any state.., or no other
person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns or return information...
shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in connection with his
service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise under the provisions of ... § 6103. I.R.C.
§ 6103 (1986).
With respect to unauthorized disclosures, § 7431 (a)(2) of the Code states that "if any person
who is not an officer or employee of the United States knowingly, or by reason of negligence,
discloses any return or return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of
§ 6103, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against such person in a district court
of the United States." I.R.C. § 7431(a)(2) (1986).
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provides for an additional category and amount payable for a user
fee under § 6.031(a) of Rev. Proc. 90-17 for ADRs.144
XII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given the complexity and costs obviously associated with a
request for an Advanced Determination Ruling pursuant to the draft
Rev. Proc., and particularly given that the Service is empowered to
review the Advanced Determination Ruling at any time to
determine the extent to which it comports with economic reality (as
the Service determines that economic reality), it is questionable
whether any company would bother to request an Advanced
Determination Ruling.
As indicated earlier, the explorations of this article were based
upon the draft revenue procedure. The Service circulated the draft
revenue procedure to receive comments as to how the procedure
might be improved. It was suggested earlier that there may very
well be an inherent conflict between the marginal approach which
the Service is under a legal obligation to employ and the more
"relaxed" average determinations which may very well be
employed by the majority of private sector enterprises. Even if the
Commissioner desires to provide simplified procedures, perhaps
based on the notions of "rough justice," unless the Congress takes
note of the differing economic approaches and provides statutory
authorization for a less demanding standard of scrutiny, it is quite
unlikely that any true simplification with respect to taxpayer
compliance will be realized. Indeed, given the trend toward income
tax rate reductions in the 1980s, Congress has turned to base-
broadening and increased compliance in order to increase tax
revenues and, notwithstanding these efforts, very little progress has
been made on reducing the deficit! Thus, it does not seem likely
that, in general, any simplification will occur in the area of
taxpayer compliance and, in particular, is unlikely that the well-
intentioned effort of the Service to provide certainty in the area of
144. Prop. Rev. Proc. 90-_ § 7 reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l 565 (1990).
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§ 482 compliance as reflected in the draft Revenue Procedure will
prove fruitful.
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APPENDIX A
AVERAGE COST PRICING CONCEPTS V. MARGINAL
COST PRICING CONCEPTS IN BuSINESS DECISIONS
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide the reader with a
sound intuitive understanding of the concepts of average cost
pricing and marginal cost pricing.1 Although the material will be
somewhat technical, there will be no attempt to resolve an issue of
debate which dates back more than thirty years, nor will the reader
be expected to become overzealous in the use of mathematical
rigor.2
Figure A3 depicts the average cost (AC) curve and marginal
cost (MC) curve for a firm in a purely competitive market. The
vertical axis represents cost per unit while the horizontal axis
represents the quantity of units sold. Thus, each ordered pair on the
average cost curve is of the form (Qi, AC) which represents the
average cost associated with the i-th unit of output, while on the
marginal cost curve, each ordered pair is of the form (Qi, MCI)
which represents the marginal cost associated with output level Qi.
Thus, the vertical distance for any value of Q from the horizontal
axis to the average cost curve represents the average cost of that
level of output and the vertical distance from the horizontal axis to
the marginal cost curve represents the marginal cost of that unit of
output. As we shall see below, the long run competitive
equilibrium will occur at the point where marginal cost and average
cost are equal, that is, the point at which the two curves cross.
1. For a more contemporary discussion of the concepts of Average Cost Pricing and Marginal
Cost Pricing, see Bonnisseau & Cornet, Existence of Equilibria When Firms Follow Bounded Losses
Pricing Rules, 17 J. MATHEmATICAL EcoN. 119-47 (1988); Kamiya, Existence and Uniqueness of
Equilibria with Increasing Returns, 17 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 139-78 (1988); Ledyard, Incentive
Compatible Space Station Pricing, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 274-79 (1986); Willman, Pricing Policiesfor
Outdoor Recreation, 64 LAND ECON. 234-41 (1988).
2. See generally W. BAUMO., ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (4th ed.1977)
(providing the analytical framework for the assertions contained herein); J. HENDERSON & R.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH (3d ed.1980) (giving a rigorous
mathematical treatment of the subject); G. THuESEN & W. FABRYCKY, ENOINEERINO ECONOMY (6th
ed.1984).
3. See BAUMOL at 396.
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The crux of the argument suggested in the article is that a
businessperson in the period of adjustment towards competitive
equilibrium may base pricing on average concepts rather than the
more sophisticated marginal concepts. That the marginal concept
is more sophisticated than the average concept can be determined
from the mathematical sophistication required to compute average
cost and marginal cost. To compute average cost, the total cost for
a given quantity of output is simply divided by the number of units
of that output. Marginal cost, on the other hand, is computed as the
first derivative of the total cost function, which requires taking the
limit of the difference quotient for infinitesimal changes in the total
cost function. The level of mathematical knowledge required to
determine average cost is relatively simple algebra whereas the
knowledge required in order to determine marginal cost is at the
level of relatively elementary calculus.4
Figure A considers the implication of employing the average
concept rather than the marginal concept. At output level Q1, which
is associated with the average cost level of AC1 , a businessperson
4. Although it may be somewhat an overstatement of the difference in the degree of
sophistication between the two concepts, it might be noted that the level of knowledge necessary to
determine average cost is that taught in the freshman year of high school while the knowledge
required to determine marginal cost is normally taught as a part of a first course in college calculus.
It is not at all unrealistic to suppose that, of the more than five million small and medium size
businesses in the United States, many executives are much more comfortable with average concepts
than marginal concepts.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
marking up to price at retail with a thirty percent gross margin
would obtain a selling price of 1.30 AC,, noted in Figure A as the
ordered pair (Q1, 1.3 AC1). On the other hand, applying the same
mark-up based upon marginal cost at QI, the price obtained is that
shown in the ordered pair (QI, 1.30 MCI). At this point in the cost
structure, average cost pricing results in a higher price than
marginal cost pricing. Given the effect of the competitive
marketplace and the inability of the individual firm to affect price
in a purely competitive market, the selling price may be the lower
of the two prices. For this to be the case, the gross profit per unit
would be lower and average cost would be relatively higher,
meaning that the deductible part of unit revenue would be
proportionately higher.
The Internal Revenue Service (Service), if it were following
marginal concepts, would want to argue that a firm really was
experiencing deductible costs at the level of MC1 , and that
therefore its unit gross profit, ergo, in the final analysis, its taxable
income, is higher than would be the case based upon the firm's
position. On the other hand, at Q2, where the firm is confronted
with average cost lower than its marginal cost, the ostensible
position of the parties would be reversed. However, if, indeed, the
firm continued to base its mark-ups on average cost rather than
marginal cost, it would soon find itself plunging into bankruptcy
since an assumed thirty percent mark-up based on average cost
would result in a price lower than the unit marginal cost at that
level of production. While the service might very well wish to
argue that the deductible amount was the lower figure of average
cost, nevertheless, the economic reality of the firm's declining
fortunes would permit it to argue conclusively that average cost
was an understatement of the true cost. If, in the long run, the
market price of the item cannot be raised, the firm will cease to
produce the item. Effectively then, the argument that the parties'
differing perceptions of economic reality, that is, the firm
employing average cost pricing while the Service argues that the
proper basis for determination of cost is marginal cost pricing is
really only applicable in the region of output where average cost
exceeds marginal cost.
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Figure B5 adds to the analysis the firm's demand curve. The
demand curve is horizontal in that, in a purely competitive market,
the number of firms is so large that the additional units sold by any
one firm is not enough to result in decreasing per unit prices and,
therefore, rather than a downward sloping demand curve, the
individual firm is based with a horizontal demand curve, which is
also the average revenue curve for the firm. The total revenue
received by the firm then is obtained by multiplying the average
revenue, that is the price per unit sold, by the total number of units
sold which is represented by the area under the demand curve
between the origin and a given quantity sold. In the short run,
profit maximizing will occur for the output level Qp at which
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The firm, at that point,
earns a per unit profit obtained as the vertical distance between the
point of intersection of the marginal cost and marginal revenue
curves and the average cost which corresponds to the level of
output QP. The firm's total profit for the level of output Q, is
represented by the area UVWD. The implication for the analysis of
average cost pricing verses marginal cost pricing in Figure B is
that, for any output level less than Qp, there is a greater constraint
on the percentage mark-up based upon average cost than that based
upon marginal cost since the price is determined by the purely
competitive market and the vertical distance from the average cost
curve to the demand curve is less than the vertical distance
5. See BAUMOL at 396.
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between the marginal cost curve and the demand curve. Beyond the
quantity Qp, any mark-up based on marginal cost would very
quickly lead to inventory accumulation as a result of unsold
product and either the firm would be forced to engage in
substantial cost-cutting to return profitability or else leaved the
industry. On the other hand, at least nominally, in the region
beyond QP, mark-ups based upon average cost will result in
competitively priced product but, nevertheless, in this region the
implications of marginal cost per unit exceeding marginal revenue






In Figure C,6 the long run equilibrium position of the firm is
depicted reflecting the fact that the per unit profits denoted in
Figure B induce the entry of other firms into the industry, driving
unit profits to zero. In this case, the optimum quantity will be Qp
and for quantities less that QP, mark-ups based upon average cost
would very quickly lead to inventory accumulation which would
precipitate price declines, while mark-ups based on marginal cost
would be constrained to not exceed the price per unit. But since
Figure C depicts equilibrium, practically speaking, all firms would
be operating at a level of output comparable to Qp implying that
the marketplace would have provided to them "perfect
information" in terms of efficient manufacturing and pricing of the
6. See id.
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product relative to the equilibriating needs of the market. It is to be
noted that:
In equilibrium, every firm in the industry must have
the same costs, for the product price will be the same
for all such companies and both marginal and average
costs will equal price . . . Firms with dissimilar
resources, production techniques, and operating
procedures all end up with the same costs ... (as a
result of) of the competitive mechanism.... The zero
profit rule may seem implausible at first glance...
The term "profits" is used here in a rather strict
sense. A small businessman may earn a comfortable
living. But if his earnings are no more than he can get
by spending the same amount of time working for
someone else, plus the return he can get by investing
his money elsewhere, the economist states that he is
receiving just the wages for his labor and interest on
his capital. Only if he receives any more than this
sum is the excess counted as profit. It is surely true
that many a small businessman has shown himself
willing to work for even negative profits (i.e., lower
total return as salary and return on capital) when the
term is interpreted in this sense.7
It is quite likely that the existence of a fairly competitive
equilibrium in any economy is at most a transitory phenomenon. In
the purely competitive equilibrium, since average cost equals
marginal cost, the feedback of perfect information to the price
determination process leads to a consistent position by both
interested parties, that is, the reporting entrepreneur and the Internal
Revenue Service. It is interesting to note, however, that under these
circumstances, since the economic profit is zero, the firm itself has
no taxable income and the only tax consequences are indirect to the
extent that the entrepreneur's employment with the firm produces
taxable income to him and the entrepreneur's investment of capital
7. Id. at 398 (parenthetical added).
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produces a return on that capital comparable to returns available to
him in the capital markets generally.
Thus, if the Service is driven by legal mandate to presume
marginal cost pricing consistent with competitive equilibria while
the vast majority of entrepreneurs base decisions on less than
perfect information and base pricing upon average cost concepts,
it is quite obvious that the parties may be motivated by
"irreconcilable differences" which may only be resolved through
"rough justice."
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APPENDIX B
THE THEORY OF PERFECT INFORMATION
The value of information has increased dramatically over the
past fifty years with the advent of electronic data processing.
Indeed, recent studies have indicated that fifty-nine percent of the
jobs in the American economy are involved with the collection,
processing, and analyzing of information while seventeen percent
of the jobs are in the industrial manufacturing sector, with the
balance comprised of jobs in the non information processing
services sector and the extractive industry sector. While it appears
that employment in the information services sector has peaked,
current figures indicate that it constitutes well above fifty percent
of the labor force. Thus, information costs money and perfect
information has associated with it costs which approach infinity.
The analysis which follows, as in the case of Appendix A, is
not intended to be mathematically rigorous, either in terms of its
representation of the theory of perfect information or in terms of
the comprehensiveness of the economic analysis. It is intended to
provide the reader with an intuitive understanding of the concept
of perfect information and its relationship to the theory of the
purely competitive marketplace.'
1. For a more thorough treatment of the theory of perfect information, see R. ECK, AN
INTRODUCTION TO QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR BusiNEss APPLICATION (1979). The reader is
referred in particular to chapter 16, Introduction to Statistical Decision Making and chapter 17 The
Revision of Probability Assessments and The Expected Value ofAdditional Information. For a more
thorough treatment of the theory of perfect information discussed in periodicals, see McNamara, An
Appraisal of Executive Information and Decision Support Systems, 41 J. Sys. MGMT. 14-18 (1990);
Pfeifer & Smidt, A Decision-Theoretic Valuation of Information in Sealed-bid Auctions for Items of
Known Value, 21 DECIsION Sc. 461-70 (1990); Hartbough & Turner, A Streamlined Approach for
Calculating Expected Utility and Expected Values of Perfect Information, 6 DECISION SUPPORT SYS.
1, 1-11 (1990); Sampson, The Value of Information From Multiple Sources of Uncertainty In
Decision Analysis, 39 EUR. J. OPERATION REs. 254-60 (1989).
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Figure A depicts the relationship between levels of quality and
the cost of achieving a given level of quality. The representation is
best understood by considering its implications from right to left
rather than the more common interpretation of graphical
representation which is from left to right. F3 represents the total
cost to achieve a given level of quality. Thus, the cost of achieving
the level of quality at K2, is substantially less than achieving the
much higher level of quality reflected at KI.
The analysis contemplates that, at a given level of quality, the
cost to achieve that level of quality is comprised of three
components. The first component is the cost of materials, which is
represented by the vertical distance from the horizontal axis to F,.
The second component of the total cost to achieve the given level
of quality is represented by the vertical distance between F and F2
which, mathematically, is obtained as F2 - Fl. This component of
the cost quality represents the cost of obtaining market information
about the value of a given level of quality. This component of cost
would include the cost of market research to determine consumer
perceptions as to the value of quality as well as specific
information as to the marketability of products of the given level
of quality. The third component of the cost to achieve a given level
of quality is represented for a given quality level as the vertical
distance between F2 and F3, which, mathematically, is obtained as
F3 - F2. This component of cost is that which arises from the
research necessary to develop the technology to achieve the
production excellence for increasingly higher levels of quality. The
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vertical distance from F3 to F,, mathematically determined as F3 -
F,, is the total information cost component of achieving a given
level of quality.2
The analysis suggests that, as the quality of a product
approaches perfection, the cost of achieving perfection approaches
affinity, which of course implies that no perfect product ever
reaches the marketplace. The analysis also suggests that the cost of
developing the technological know-how to produce an increasingly
perfect product approaches infinity more rapidly than the costs of
obtaining marketing information with respect to the product, which
cost, in turn, approaches infinity more rapidly than the material
costs associated with a perfect product. This relationship is only
suggestive and should not be assumed to be "cast in concrete."
In the subsequent figures, the resolution of the cost to achieve
a given level of quality will be not depicted in terms of its three
components, but rather will be included only as the total cost to
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The reader will note in Figure B that the total cost to achieve
a given level of quality is the sum of the cost to achieve that level
of quality, plus the cost which arises as a result of poor quality
(i.e., service and maintenance costs). For example, at the quality
level designated K2, the total cost which is Fc(K2) is equal to
2. For the purposes herein, it is assumed that roughly one-third of the total information cost
is allocable to the cost of market research and two-thirds is allocable to the cost to develop the
technological sophistication to build the higher quality products.
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F3(K2) + F4(K2). Thus, for a relatively low quality product, the cost
of purchasing the product reflected as the cost to achieve that level
of quality, is quite low, while the cost which arises as a result of
the poor quality is quite high, with the result that the total cost is
relatively high. On the other hand, at a level of quality approaching
perfection, say at K,, the cost of purchasing the given level of
quality is relatively high, F3(K1), while the costs arising as a result
of poor quality are relatively low, F4(K,), so that the total cost
again is relatively high. Obviously, following the quality continuum
to the left approaching perfection, the purchase cost of perfection
approaches infinity asymptotically, while the direct and indirect
costs which arise as a-result of poor quality at perfection are zero.
The optimum quality level is that for which the sum of the
purchase cost of a given level of quality plus the costs which arise
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In Figure C, a consumer demand curve which reflects the price
a consumer would be willing to pay for a given level of quality is
added as F5. The per unit profit for a given level of quality is the
vertical difference between the curve F5 and FTC, that is, for
example, at a quality'level K,, the unit profit is o5(K) - FTc(K). It
is presumable that, as the quality of the product approaches
perfection, the unit profit on a percentage basis may be higher than
at lower levels of quality, given that very high quality products are
purchased by individuals for whom prices are a secondary
consideration. At the other end of the spectrum, it should be noted
that the price which a consumer would be willing to pay is actually
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lower than the total cost, implying that qualities falling within the
region which is shaded reflect subsidized goods.
The nexus between the theory of perfect information and the
theory of equilibrium in perfectly competitive markets is that
products sold in a perfectly competitive marketplace are such that
the optimum quality of that particular market is well-known, and
that, therefore, the trade-offs as to the purchase cost to obtain a
given level of quality and the cost arising out of a given level of
poor quality are in equilibrium. By analogizing the conditions
described (with respect to the product market) to the relative
positions of tax paying enterprises, it might well be argued, that the
Internal Revenue Service because of its legal mandate, tends to
employ practices and procedures that approach perfection. From the
Services' point of view, the cost of as a result of poor quality, that
is, the tax revenues lost to the government approach zero, while, on
the other hand, the cost to achieve the high level of quality
approaching perfection asymptotically approaches infinity.
For the businessperson, the effort by the Service to approach
perfection in fulfillment of its legislative mandate implies record
keeping and compliance costs which are, at each level of quality,
to the extent possible, passed on to the consumer. If, as indicated
earlier, the firm is operating in a position of long run competitive
equilibrium, theoretically the information which it needs to compete
is known to it and therefore readily available to meet the needs of
compliance. Practically speaking, however, as noted earlier, the rule
of the marketplace is probably such that long-term competitive
equilibria exist only rarely and probably not for the long term.

